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Abstract—The number of crime committed based on the malware intrusion is never ending as the number of malware variants 
is growing tremendously and the usage of internet is expanding globally. Malicious codes easily obtained and use as one of 
weapon to gain their objective illegally. Hence, in this research, diverse logs from different OSI layer are explored to identify the 
traces left on the attacker and victim logs in order to establish worm trace pattern to defending against the attack and help 
revealing true attacker or victim.  For the purpose of this paper, it focused on malware intrusion and traditional worm namely 
sasser worm variants. The concept of trace pattern is created by fusing the attacker’s and victim’s perspective.    Therefore, the 
objective of this paper is to propose a general worm trace pattern for attacker’s, victim’s and multi-step (attacker/victim)’s by 
combining both perspectives.  These three proposed worm trace patterns can be extended into research areas in alert 
correlation and computer forensic investigation. 
Index Terms— attacker, log, multi-step, trace pattern, victim.  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
ALWARE has become a serious threat to the 
economy and to national security in recent years. 
Malware or malicious software is software that is 
residing in a system and it is intended to cause harm to 
the system. Malware that consist of Trojan, virus and 
worm had threatened the internet user and causes billion 
of losses to the internet users around the world. As com-
puter users rely ever more on the Internet to use the on-
line services, they face complex challenges in securing 
information systems and networks from attack or pene-
tration by malicious software that anytime can steal their 
credential information. 
In 2009 alone, according to anti-virus vendor Panda 
Security [1] 25 million new malware samples have been 
found luring on the Internet and this indicate that the 
level of the malware threat has tremendously increase 
and something has to be done to safeguard the Internet 
user from the threat. Malware especially worm is difficult 
to detect especially with its ability to change it behavior of 
infecting others system make the antivirus seem difficult 
to notice them. The variants of worm are often created to 
defeat the security tools, for instance a worm can mutate 
to a different variants, sometimes in only one hour [2]. 
Thus make it difficult for security tool to detect the threat. 
As a result, the study on internet attack or intrusion is 
very crucial, especially in developing an effective security 
tool to defend the internet user from the attack threat. 
This phenomenon was create  a relative common task for 
security researchers to collect data related to Internet 
threats to help the researchers to investigate the trace pat-
tern in order to find the root cause and effect of an intru-
sion in victim and attacker perspectives based on the in-
trusion’s anatomy described in [3].  Trace pattern can also 
be used as a guide to the investigator for collecting and 
tracing the evidence in forensic field [4].  
To address this adversity, the attacker’s, victim’s and 
multi-step (attacker/victim)’s trace patterns is proposed 
in this paper by fusing both attacker and victim perspec-
tives.  The various logs from different OSI layer are ex-
plored in this research to identify the traces leave on the 
attacker and victim logs and establish the general trace 
pattern that used to reveal true attacker or victim. For the 
purpose of this paper, the research only focuses on mal-
ware network intrusion specifically on sasser worm va-
riants in three different intrusion scenarios namely Scena-
rio A, Scenario B and Scenario C. 
2 RELATED WORK 
2.1 Sasser Worm 
Worm is a one of self-replicating Malware [1] that uses 
computer network to automatically send duplicate copies 
of itself to other vulnerable host connected to the net-
work. In this paper, the researcher focuses only on tradi-
tional worm specifically blaster and sasser worms as de-
scribed by [2]. 
Sasser was first noticed and started spreading on April 
30th, 2004.  It is a computer worm that affects computers 
running vulnerable versions of the Microsoft operating 
systems Windows XP and Windows 2000.  This worm was 
named Sasser because it spreads by exploiting a buffer 
overflow in the component known as LSASS (Local Securi-
ty Authority Subsystem Service) on the affected operating 
systems. Sasser is programmed to launch 128 processes 
which scan a range of random IP addresses looking for 
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systems vulnerable to the LSASS vulnerability on port 
445/TCP. Then, it installs an FTP server on port 5554 so 
that it can be downloaded by other infected computers. 
Once a vulnerable machine is found, the worm opens a 
remote shell on the machine (on TCP port 9996), and 
makes the remote machine download a copy of the worm 
namely avserve.exe or avserve2.exe for the Sasser.B variant 
in the Windows directory [5].  
In order to find new victims, Sasser scans random IP 
addresses for vulnerable machines listening on port 
445/TCP. Once such a machine is found, it attempts to 
exploit the LSASS vulnerability by sending a specially 
crafted RPC request to the LSASS named pipe on the ma-
chine. Upon successful exploitation, shell code is injected 
into the lsass.exe process, which executes a shell (cmd.exe) 
and binds it to a TCP port. The attacking instance of the 
worm then connects to this port and sends commands to 
the shell. These commands download and run the main 
worm executable on the newly infected system. The 
worm download is carried out through FTP, using the 
default Windows ftp.exe program on the client side (vic-
tim). On the server side (attacker), Sasser implements its 
own crude FTP server, which listens on a non-standard 
TCP port [6]. In this research, the researchers had discov-
ered the sasser variant used in the experiment using non-
standard TCP port 3***.  
The infection scheme of Sasser is very similar to that of 
W32/Blaster with the exception of using FTP instead of 
TFTP as the main transmission protocol. The scanner 
threads attempts to determine the local machine's IP ad-
dress.  It loops through every address returned by ge-
thostbyname for the local hostname.  If it finds a publicly 
routable Internet address (non-RFC1918) it will use that 
address.  If none are found it will use any private subnet 
address (RFC1918 or 127.0.0.1) it finds.  If no address is 
returned it will use 127.0.0.1.  The way a target IP to ex-
ploit is generated is that; 50% of the time it will attempt to 
exploit a completely random IP address, 25% of the time 
it will attempt to exploit a random address within the 
same first octet of the local subnet and 25% of the time it 
will attempt to exploit a random address within the same 
first and second octets of the local subnet. The aim is to 
increase the probability of hitting vulnerable hosts, on the 
assumption that nearby machines suffer from the same 
misconfiguration problems. The network scanning speed 
per attack thread is a maximum of four attacks per 
second, and Sasser spawns 128 attack threads running in 
parallel [6]. 
If successful, the LSASS exploit will open a shell on the 
remote system on TCP port 9996.  The worm will connect 
to this port and attempt to send the following commands:  
 
echo off&echo open (infecting machine's IP) 
5554>>cmd.ftp&echo anonymous>>cmd.ftp&echo us-
er&echo bin>>cmd.ftp&echo get 
(rand)_up.exe>>cmd.ftp&echo bye>>cmd.ftp&echo 
on&ftp -s:cmd.ftp&(rand)i_up.exe&echo off&del 
cmd.ftp&echo on 
 
This will copy the worm executable to the target ma-
chine, where it will run and begin to spread and the 
thread sleeps for 250 milliseconds, and then repeats the 
entire process again.   
When executed, the worm will installs itself to 
%WINDIR% as avserve.exe and adds the following regi-
stry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ Current-
Version\Run.  avserve.exe -> C:\%WINDIR%\avserve.exe.  
It will creates a Mutex "Jobaka31" to ensure that only one 
copy of the worm runs in memory.  Then it will spawn a 
mini-FTP server on TCP port 5554 to deliver the worm 
executable to exploited systems.  It will generate 128 
threads to scan for and exploit vulnerable systems.  After 
that it will calls API method AbortSystemShutdown to 
prevent the system from rebooting.  It will then sleeps for 
3 seconds and then loops back to the AbortSystemShut-
down call. 
An indication of the worm's infection of a given PC is 
the existence of the file C:\WIN.LOG or C:\WIN2.LOG on 
the computer hard disk, and random crashes of 
LSASS.EXE caused by faulty code used in the worm.  The 
most common characteristic of the worm is the shutdown 
timer that appears due to the worm crashing LSASS.exe 
as described in [7]. 
 
2.2 Trace Pattern 
Trace pattern is defined as a regular way of process 
discovering the origin or starting point of a scenario that 
has happened [8]. It is an essential element in helping 
investigator in a crime scene to find the evidence, for in-
stance in a computer crime the evidence can be found in 
any digital devices. The evidences of a computer crime 
can be in form of data records that consists of user activi-
ties such as login, logout, computer shutdown, files ex-
ecution and network packet.  In typical digital devices all 
these traces data are presented on logs file, such as the 
data records in a network log files consist of several se-
lected attributes such as port, action, protocol, source IP 
address and destination IP address.   
In forensic view, a victim or attacker can be identified 
based on the traces data found in the attack pattern anal-
ysis and represent in the form of trace pattern in which 
the trace pattern can help determine how a crime is being 
committed. Attack pattern is type of pattern that is speci-
fied from attacker perspective. The pattern describes how 
an attack is performed, enumerates the security patterns 
that can be applied to defeat the attack, and describes 
how to trace the attack once it has occurred [9].  
An attack pattern presents a logical description of the 
attack goals and attack approaches for defending against 
and tracing the attack.  Hence, attack patterns can guide 
forensic investigators in searching the evidence and the 
patterns can serve as a structured method for obtaining 
and representing relevant network forensic information.  
This also helps the forensic investigator at the data collec-
tion phase that requires the investigator to determine and 
identifying all the components to be collected, deciding 
the priority of the data, finding the location of the com-
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ponents and collecting data from each of the component 
during the investigation process [10].  
There are various explanations on describing the term 
attack pattern.  In general, researches describe the term 
attack pattern as the steps in generating attack and ex-
ploiting the target as mentioned in [11], [12], [13] [10], [9] 
and imperative to provide a way to protect them from 
any potential attack.  However, all of the researchers are 
only concentrating on the attacker’s perspective without 
considering the victim’s perspective.  Therefore, the trace 
patterns are proposed in this research by deliberating on 
the attacker’s, victim’s and attacker/victim’s (multi-step) 
perspectives in order to have a clear view on how the at-
tack is performed and caused the impact to the target.  In 
this research, trace pattern on multi-step perspective is 
established that is motivated based on the study by [14] to 
help the investigator on revealing the  true attacker or 
victim in which [15] describes a multi-step attack is a se-
quence of attack steps from the attacker performed the 
attack until the compromised host start generating a new 
attack to another target. 
In the next section, researchers present the intrusion 
scenario used in this research to gather and analyse logs 
for designing the proposed worm trace pattern. 
3 INTRUSION SCENARIO 
A controlled experiment is designed in this research in 
order to run the worm intrusion, to collect logs from each 
of the devices involved and to design the intrusion scena-
rio. This experimental approach used four phases: Net-
work Environment Setup, Attack Activation, Trace Pattern 
Log Collection and Trace Pattern Log Analysis as described 
in [8] 
In this experiment, the worm intrusion is launched 
and the intrusion activities are captured in the selected 
logs which are personal firewall log, security log, system log, 
application log, IDS log, tcpdump and Wireshark log. The 
researchers have collected all logs generated during the 
experiment and three intrusion scenarios are derived 
based on the log analysis are identified as Scenario A, 
Scenario B and Scenario C as depicted in Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and 
Fig. 3 respectively. Each analysis for each intrusion scena-
rio involved with selected logs that divided into host lev-
el: security log, application log, system log and personal 
firewall log and network level: IDS Alert log. 
Based on the experiment setup, the researcher 
launched the attack host Selamat in all three scenarios 
identified. However, the victim and the victim/attacker 
for each scenario were different.  In Scenario A as in Fig. 
1, Selamat is successfully exploited host Roslan that mark 
with 445, 9996, 5554 and 3***. However, host Yusof was 
mark with 445 and 9996 that describes the attacker is al-
ready open the backdoor but unable to transfer the mali-
cious codes through port 5554.  Then, the compromised 
host (Roslan) has begun a new attack on host Mohd. 
 
Fig. 1  Sasser Intrusion Scenario: Scenario A 
 
On the other hand, Scenario B as in Fig. 2 demon-
strates that host Roslan and Ramly became the targets of 
the attack. Selamat is completely exploited host Ramly 
that marks with 445, 9996, 5554 and 3***, but unable to 
transfer the exploit codes to Ramly which indicates with 
445 and 9996. Subsequently, the infected host (Ramly) 
managed to exploit host Roslan completely (445, 9996, 
5554 and 3***). Next, once the host Roslan is infected, it 
continually launches an attack and successfully exploit 
host Sahib. 
 
Fig. 2  Sasser Intrusion Scenario: Scenario B 
 
Meanwhile in intrusion Scenario C as represented in 
Fig. 3, Selamat was successfully exploit host Sahib (445, 
9996, 5554, 3***) and manage to open the backdoor at host 
Tarmizi (445, 9996) but unable to upload the exploit codes 
through port 5554. Once Sahib is infected, it automatically 
generates an attack to another target which still unin-
fected. In this scenario, Sahib is successfully exploited 
Tarmizi since Tarmizi is still uninfected host. 
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Fig. 3  Sasser Intrusion Scenario: Scenario C 
 
The intrusion scenarios are summarized as in TABLE 1 
in which the attack was launched from host Selamat 
(192.112.111.104).  
 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF INTRUSION SCENARIO 
 
Intrusion 
Scenario 
Origin of 
Attack 
Exploited Node 
(Victim) 
Compromised Node (Vic-
tim/Attacker) 
Level 1 Level 2 
Scenario A 192.112.111.104 / 
Selamat 192.112.111.102/ Yusof 
192.112.112.200/ 
Roslan 
192.112.112.200/ 
Roslan 
- 
Scenario B 192.112.111.104 / 
Selamat 192.112.112.196/ Ramly 
192.112.112.200 / 
Roslan 
192.112.112.196/ 
Ramly 
192.112.112.200 
/ Roslan 
Scenario C 192.112.111.104 / 
Selamat 192.112.110.182 / Tarmizi 
192.112.110.144/ 
Sahib 
192.112.110.144/ 
Sahib 
- 
 
Roslan, Ramly and Sahib were successfully exploited by 
Selamat in Scenario A, Scenario B and Scenario C respec-
tively and became an attacker to another uninfected host 
that shown as compromised node (victim/attacker): Level 
1. In compromised node in Level 2, it describes that Ros-
lan in Scenario B was attacked and exploited by Ramly 
which was infected previously in Level 1. These attacks 
are known as multi-step attack although Roslan and Ram-
ly are became a victim or attacker in different level. 
4 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Three intrusion scenarios discussed in section III are 
further analyzed and the findings from this analysis are 
used as the primary guideline in establishing the generic 
worm trace pattern in victim, attacker and multi-step (vic-
tim/attacker) perspectives by observing the traces leave 
on the selected logs.  The details of the trace pattern anal-
ysis from each perspective are explained in the following 
sub-section. 
 
 
4.1 Worm Trace Pattern Analysis: Victim 
Perspective 
 The victim’s data traces are discovered from the logs 
at the victim’s host and network log.  The summary of the 
data traces for all scenarios derived as discussed in sec-
tion III are shown in TABLE 2 and the evidences are 
found in personal firewall log, security log, system log, appli-
cation log and alert IDS log based on the traces present in 
each log that significant to the intrusion trace pattern. 
In Personal Firewall log for each scenario, there are sig-
nificant vulnerable ports exist that can be used by mali-
cious codes to exploit which exploits a security hole in the 
LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, 
which corresponds to the executable file lsass.exe) in 
Windows on its victims which are  TCP/445 that used for 
worm scanning activity and port TCP/9996, TCP/5554 and 
TCP/3*** that is used for exploiting activity. According to 
[16],[17], [17] and [5], this traces data is considered as part 
of this victim’s trace. In this analysis, researchers found 
trace of port TCP/3*** is used by sasser to transfer the ex-
ploit code and without this port is opened, the attacker 
unable to transfer the malicious codes to the target or vic-
tim although port TCP/5554 is opened. 
 
TABLE 2 
  SUMMARY OF SASSER TRACES ON VICTIM’S LOG FOR SCE-
NARIO A, SCENARIO B AND SCENARIO C 
(√=TRACES FOUND; X=TRACES NOT FOUND) 
 
 
 
In Security log, the traces data from the security log 
shows that there is a new process created by system 
proves by the existence of event id 592.  It has installed 
the FTP server in order to permit the exploit codes down-
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loaded by other infected computers as shown on the im-
age file name that are ftp.exe and *_up.exe. 
Meanwhile, Application log shows the traces data of 
sasser infected machine that indicates the lsass.exe appli-
cation error on the event id 1015 and the event message is 
lsass.exe fail. Subsequently, the infected machine will 
shutdown and restart again as shown in the System log by 
showing the new process created on event id 1074 and the 
event message is “the system process: 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\lsass.exe terminated unexpectedly 
with status code 128”. Although these traces data only 
found in Scenario C, the trace is still significant based on 
the side effect of sasser worm in which this worm will 
exploit lsass.exe application, make it crashed and reboot 
the machine automatically as reported in several antivirus 
organization such as [16]. 
The alert IDS log shows that there is an activity called 
lsass exploit attempt on port 445/TCP where the source 
IP address is the attacker and the destination IP address is 
the victim. These traces identify that there is a pattern 
exists on how the sasser worm initiates the communica-
tion and exploit the lsass service that used to verifies the 
validity of user logons to host or server. Lsass generates 
the process responsible for authenticating users for the 
Winlogon service. This is performed by using authentica-
tion packages. If authentication is successful, Lsass gene-
rates the user's access token, which is used to launch the 
initial shell. Other processes that the user initiates then 
inherit this token. In this case, the worm attempts to ob-
tain the authentication on executing the ftp server to 
transfer the exploit code to the target. 
 
4.2 Worm Trace Pattern Analysis: Attacker 
Perspective 
The attacker’s host and network log have been ana-
lyzed in order to extract the attacker’s data trace in which 
it will be used as the evidence for the intrusion commit-
ted. Based on the analysis, the evidence are found in per-
sonal firewall log, security log, system log, application log and 
ids alert log in all scenarios as summarized in TABLE 3. 
The details of the attacker’s logs are discussed as follow-
ing. 
The traces data leaved in attacker’s Personal Firewall 
Log shown the vulnerable ports that are used by the at-
tacker to open the backdoor in order to exploit the remote 
shell and transfer the exploit codes on its victims as re-
ferred to [17], [18], [16] and [5]. The pattern of the traces 
data are 445 OPEN TCP, 9996 OPEN TCP, 5554 OPEN-
INBOUND TCP and OPEN 3*** TCP.  
The traces data from the security log shows that there 
is a new process created (Event ID: 592) that shows the 
sasser worm is activated based on the trace shows on the 
image file name. The impact of the attack also found from 
the traces leave on system log and application log. The trac-
es data shows from system log are Event ID: 1074 with the 
Event Message is system shutdown and restart. On the 
other hand, the traces data found in Application log shows 
the Event ID: 1015 with Event Message is lsass.exe failed. 
The traces data found in both log is explain the side-effect 
of the worm is for LSASS.EXE to crash, by default such 
system will reboot after the crash occurs as described in 
[16]. 
 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF SASSER TRACES ON ATTACKER’S LOG FOR SCE-
NARIO A, SCENARIO B AND SCENARIO C 
(√=TRACES FOUND; X=TRACES NOT FOUND) 
 
In the alert IDS log, ScanUPnP presents the pattern of 
scanning activity which shows the behavior of traditional 
worm attack in general and sasser worm attack in specific 
[19].  Therefore, this trace discovers that the owner of the 
source IP address is a potential attacker who launched the 
worm. 
 
4.3 Worm Trace Pattern Analysis: Multi-step 
(Victim/Attacker) Perspective 
The multi-step (Attacker/Victim)’s traces data is iden-
tified based on the extracted data from the logs at the vic-
tim’s host and network log in each scenario.  The sum-
mary of the data traces on the multi-step and network 
logs for all scenarios are represented in TABLE 4 and the 
evidences are found in personal firewall log, security log, 
system log, application log and IDS alert log. The details of 
the traces of the multi-step’s logs are discussed. 
There are two different patterns existing in personal 
firewall log that discover attacker and victim traces as 
shown in TABLE 4. The table shows in victim’s perspec-
tive, the traces data found (445 OPEN-INBOUND TCP, 
9996 OPEN-INBOUND TCP, 5554 OPEN) indicate that the 
local host is permitted the FTP service from the remote 
host. The trace data on 3*** OPEN-INBOUND TCP indi-
cates the host allowed to get the malicious codes from the 
remotes host. 
While, from the attacker perspective (445 OPEN TCP, 
9996 OPEN TCP, 5554 OPEN-INBOUND), the patterns 
indicate that the local host is opened an outbound session 
to the remote host which allow the local host transmit the 
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payload (worm codes) to the remote host. The trace data 
on 3*** OPEN TCP indicates the host allowed to commu-
nicate on transferring the worm code to the remote host 
or the target. These communication activities are done by 
vulnerable ports open exploitation.  
 
TABLE 4 
SUMMARY OF SASSER TRACES ON MULTI-STEP (VIC-
TIM/ATTACKER)’S LOG FOR SCENARIO A, SCENARIO B AND 
SCENARIO C 
(√=TRACES FOUND; X=TRACES NOT FOUND) 
Therefore, the traces data found are significant to the 
multi-step attack (victim/attacker) where this host was 
infected (act as victim) and as long as the computer was 
infected with the worm code (avserve2), it (act as attacker) 
continued to generate traffic to attempt to infect other 
vulnerable computers [17]. 
The traces data in security log in TABLE 4 shows that 
there is a new process created (Event ID: 592) by system 
which initiates the FTP service in all scenarios. This ser-
vice is used to receive and sent the sasser worm code 
(*_up.exe) and execute the sasser worm code (*_up.exe or 
avserver2.exe: if the host is rebooted) remotely. This trace 
pattern indicates that this host is became a victim of 
worm attack that received the sasser code (*_up.exe) and 
became an attacker to another target by executing the 
sasser code (*_up.exe) as shown on the image file name. It 
identify that this host was infected previously and auto-
matically attempt to transfer the worm code by generat-
ing traffic to exploit other vulnerable computers.  
System log shows the traces data of the Sasser-infected 
machine stops in Scenario C by showing the new process 
created on event id 1074 that indicates the system shut-
down and restart. This data traces can be support by the 
traces data found in Application log that showing the new 
process created on event id 1015 that indicates the 
lsass.exe application is failed. These patterns are signifi-
cant with the victim pattern in which if the host is in-
fected by sasser worm, the lsass.exe application is failed 
and crashed that force the windows restart. 
TABLE 4 also describes there are traces found in the 
alert IDS log are NETBIOS Unicode share access, NETBIOS 
lsass exploit attempt and SHELLCODE detected, and SCA-
NUPnP activities for victim and attacker respectively. The 
NETBIOS Unicode share access, NETBIOS lsass exploit at-
tempt and SHELLCODE detected activities trace indicates 
that there is a pattern exists on how the sasser worm in-
itiates the client to share and exploit the lsass application.  
These traces identify the source IP address is the attacker 
and the destination IP address is the victim. On the other 
hand, the SCANUPnP trace proves that there is scanning 
activity on the vulnerable open port. This trace indicates 
that the source IP address is the attacker who activated 
the worm. Both traces found in TABLE 4 are significant to 
the pattern that found in victim and attacker. 
The summary of the analysis as shown in TABLE 2, 
TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 identified findings on the signifi-
cant attributes from victim, attacker and multi-step traces 
data. Hence, these findings are further use to form the 
proposed general worm trace pattern. 
5 PROPOSED GENERAL WORM TRACE PATTERN 
This research proposed a general worm trace pattern 
based on victim, attacker and multi-step perspective. The 
details are described in this section as the following. 
 
5.1 General Victim’s Trace Pattern 
Victim’s trace pattern can be used as a guide during 
digital forensic investigation in order to provide a precise 
hypothesis on how the intrusion happened such as how 
the victim attacked by the potential attacker. In this re-
search, a general Sasser victim’s trace pattern is estab-
lished as depicted in Fig. 4 based on the findings from 
TABLE 2. 
Fig.4  Proposed General Sasser Victim’s Trace Pattern 
 
From the traces found as shown in Fig. 4, from per-
sonal firewall log and security log indicate the worm trace 
pattern at the victim’s host used vulnerable open port 
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with specific protocol to permit the scanning and trans-
mitting the exploit codes from remote host which launch 
the windows shell to initiate worm code download. In 
this research, the findings found that Sasser trace pattern 
at the victim’s host identified in the personal firewall log 
shows this worm is used port 445 TCP, 9996 TCP, 5554 
TCP and 3*** TCP to complete its activities on scanning 
and exploiting the target host. These activities had been 
confirmed by traces found in security log about the im-
pact from the attack that shows new process created 
(Event ID: 592) on FTP service and *_up.exe as shown in 
image file name. These traces indicate how sasser worm 
transfer the exploit code (*_up.exe) to the target host. 
The traces also found from system log, application log 
and IDS alert log. In system log and application log, the 
traces found from the attributes Event ID and Event Mes-
sage show the impact of the attack. Meanwhile, the intru-
sion activity and alarm had been traced from the IDS alert 
logs based on the attribute: error message, source IP ad-
dress, destination IP address and destination port. The 
trace of source IP address and destination IP address in 
the IDS alert logs identified the victim and the attacker 
respectively.  
In this research, the traces found indicate the impact of 
the sasser worm intrusion that shows trace of the 
lsass.exe application failed found in application log that 
caused system crashed which initiate the system shut-
down. This impact has been proved as the trace of system 
shutdown and restart is found in the application log. The 
traces found from the IDS alert log also supports all the 
traces found on the host log such as the lsass exploit at-
tempt which explain exploiting activities done by sasser 
worm. 
 
5.2 General Attacker’s Trace Pattern 
Attacker’s trace pattern is useful to guide forensic in-
vestigators in searching the evidence and provide a struc-
tured method for obtaining and representing relevant 
digital forensic information. This pattern provides a sys-
tematic description of the attack goals and strategies for 
tracing the attack.  
Fig. 5 Proposed General Sasser Attacker’s Trace Pattern 
The overall Sasser attacker’s trace pattern that found in 
various logs as depicted in Fig. 5 is derived based on the 
findings in TABLE 3. The traces indicate the sasser worm 
pattern at the attacker’s host used port 445 TCP to allow 
the local host scan and transmit exploit codes to the re-
mote host which launch the windows shell to initiate 
worm code download used port 9996 TCP. Then it 
launched the FTP client service using port 5554 TCP and 
open port 3*** TCP to permit the client (remote host) 
download the worm code from the local host. The activity 
of SCANUPnP trace that explains the scanning activities 
done by sasser worm also existed in the network log that 
supports all the traces found on the host log. 
 
5.3 General Multi-step (Victim/Attacker)’s Trace 
Pattern 
Multi-step’s trace pattern is used as a guide for foren-
sic investigators to reveal and prove the true attacker or 
victim. This trace pattern is a combination of victim’s 
and attacker’s trace pattern in which the traces data is 
extracted from a log for the same host that divided into 
primary and secondary evidence. 
The overall traces data on multi-step at the host’s logs 
from victim/attacker perspective illustrated in Fig. 6 indi-
cate that the sasser worm used port 445 TCP to permit the 
scanning activity and it is supported by the traces found 
in network logs that show SCANUPnP activities. 
 
 
Fig. 6  Proposed General Multi-step (Victim/Attacker)’s Trace Pattern 
 
The worm then transmit exploit codes from remote 
host which launch the windows shell to initiate down-
loading the worm code using port 9996 TCP and it 
launched the FTP client service on port 5554 TCP and 
open port 3*** TCP to download/upload the exploit 
codes.  This worm activity is shown by the traces found in 
network logs that confirm the existence of lsass exploit 
attempt activities.  Once the host is infected (act as victim), 
it’s (act as attacker) then generate traffic; attempt to infect 
other vulnerable hosts.  
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The source IP address from host log indicates that the 
remote host is the attacker and the destination IP address 
which is the local host is the victim. Hence, multi-step 
(victim/attacker) trace pattern could identify the true 
victim or attacker. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Trace pattern of an intrusion in an intrusion scenario 
is constructed by analyzing heterogeneous logs from 
diverse devices in victim, attacker and victim/attacker 
(multi-step) perspectives. These trace patterns offer a 
systematic description of the impact of the intrusion, the 
intrusion goals and intrusion strategies for tracing the 
attack in order to create a precise hypothesis about the 
intrusion on revealing the attacker or victim.  For 
example, personal firewall logs provide information on 
how the attacker entered the network and how the 
exploits were performed; meanwhile event logging such 
as security log, system log and application log enables 
network administrators to collect important information 
such as date, time and result of each action during the 
setup and execution of an intrusion. Therefore, the 
propose victim, attacker and multi-step (victim/attacker) 
trace patterns in this paper can be extended into research 
areas in alert correlation and computer forensic 
investigation. 
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